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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-seventh year

Identical letters dated 11 March 2012 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I must draw your urgent attention to the escalation of deadly violence and terror being perpetrated by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people, particularly in the Gaza Strip in recent days. In grave violation of the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the occupying Power has been carrying out a series of military strikes, including extrajudicial killings and military assaults, against civilians and civilian areas that have led in the past few days to the killing of at least 18 Palestinians, among them a 12-year-old boy, and the wounding of dozens of other civilians, including women and children, many of whom remain in serious condition.

The extremely fragile situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, is worsening and risks further destabilization as a result of this Israeli aggression and its incessant illegal actions against the Palestinian civilian population. We call on the international community, particularly the Security Council, to uphold its obligations under the Charter and under international law, including international humanitarian law, as it pertains to the rights and protection of civilians in armed conflict, including foreign occupation. The Palestinian people cannot remain the exception to this responsibility to protect civilians from such war crimes and atrocities.

The most recent Israeli attacks against the Gaza Strip involve Israel's extrajudicial killing, i.e., targeted assassination, of two Palestinian men, Zuhair Al-Qaisy and Mahmoud Hanani, on Friday, 9 March, in a military air strike on the vehicle in which the men were riding in Gaza City. The deliberate assassination of those men was followed by a series of air strikes by the Israeli occupying forces against other areas in the Gaza Strip throughout Saturday, 10 March, including missile strikes by warplanes on Beit Lahiya, Deir Al-Balah and the Shuja'iya neighbourhood

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of Gaza City. The attacks resulted in the killing of another 10 Palestinians, with reports indicating that their bodies were torn to pieces by the missiles that struck them. These barbaric attacks by the occupying Power also resulted in the injury of at least 21 other Palestinians, among them several children and women, and three victims remain in critical condition.

Today, 11 March, Israel has continued to launch more attacks against the Gaza Strip from the dark early morning hours and throughout the day, causing more death, destruction and fear and trauma among the Palestinian civilian population. Air strikes have been deliberately launched with the aim of committing the extrajudicial execution of yet more Palestinians. A strike targeting a motorcycle travelling near Rabia Al-Adawiya school in Rafa, in the south of Gaza, killed Mahdi Abu Shawish.

This same vicious practice was carried out by an Israeli drone, which fired upon a motorcycle near Khan Younis, killing two other Palestinians, Hussein Barham Al-Breim and Mansour Kamal Abu Nuseira. In yet another attack, the Israeli occupying forces struck at the Jabaliya refugee camp in northern Gaza, killing a young boy, Ayoub Useila, age 12, and wounding his 7-year-old cousin. Israeli warplanes also fired at an area in the Zaytoun neighbourhood of Gaza City, killing Ahmad Dieb Salim, age 24, in what clearly appears to be another extrajudicial killing. Also, a farmer in Gaza City, Adel Al-Issi, age 52, was killed by an Israeli missile fired from a warplane as he was tending to his field.

Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable for these crimes of aggression against the Palestinian people. The international community, including the Security Council, must act forthwith to bring an immediate halt to this escalation of violence and to demand that Israel abide by its legal obligations under the Charter and as an occupying Power under the Fourth Geneva Convention. International law, including humanitarian and human rights law, cannot be selectively applied when it comes to the Palestinian people, who continue to unjustly suffer under Israel's now nearly 45-year military occupation. The Palestinian people must be accorded the same rights and protections guaranteed by international law as all other peoples, and the international community, including the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, has the duty to ensure respect for those provisions of international humanitarian law that protect the rights, safety and well-being of a people living under foreign occupation. If Israel is allowed to continue to flagrantly and deliberately breach the law without accountability, this will only ensure the bolstering of its impunity and the further escalation of its crimes against the Palestinian people, with far-reaching consequences for the future of our people and the prospects for peace and stability to ever be realized. We thus call on the international community to act with urgency to address this crisis.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 419 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 24 February 2012 (A/ES-10/547-S/2012/116), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

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Security Council

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Identical letters dated 11 March 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I write this letter as one million people in southern Israel continue to be terrorized during yet another weekend, fearing for their lives, enduring barrage after barrage of rocket attacks. During the past 48 hours, over 150 rockets were fired at Israeli communities, including over 40 Grad missiles. These rockets are targeted at civilians — one of them falling directly on a school. I ask you to picture how different the current situation would be if the children had been in school at the time the rocket fell.

In previous letters, the latest of which was sent just a few days ago, we warned of the dangers of inaction by the international community. We alerted the Security Council that these attacks had the potential to ignite a serious escalation of the conflict, which could affect the entire region. The events of the last two days have proven the danger of silence of the international community at large, and the Council in particular. For the sake of security and stability in our region, the Security Council and all responsible members of the international community must immediately and unequivocally condemn and do everything in their power to stop the rocket fire that continues to rain down on Israeli civilians, in violation of every precept of international law.

The number of rockets launched in only 48 hours proves that the smuggling of advanced weaponry by the Iranian regime into the Gaza Strip continues unabated. Every weapon smuggled into the area not only threatens Israeli civilians, but also diminishes Gaza's prospects for a prosperous future by transforming residential communities into rocket launching pads. Member States' obligations to prevent this illegal activity are an integral part of numerous Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1860 (2009), but it receives hardly any attention from the international community.

Israel holds the Hamas terrorist organization fully responsible for all attacks emanating from the Gaza Strip, where it remains in de facto control. Israel has exercised and will continue to exercise its right to self-defence, as appropriate, and will take all necessary measures to protect its citizens.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Haim **Waxman**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Security Council

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Assessment report of the Secretary-General on the status of the negotiations in Cyprus

I. Introduction

1. This report provides an updated assessment of the state of the negotiations in Cyprus since my last report, of 8 August 2011 (S/2011/498).

2. From the outset, the United Nations has safeguarded the principle that this process is, and has always been, Cypriot-owned and Cypriot-led. The role of the United Nations has been to facilitate the talks and provide assistance, at the specific request of the sides. Both sides made a commitment in 2008 to take ownership and thus to bear responsibility for the process.

3. Since the beginning of full-fledged negotiations in September 2008, I have met six times with the leaders of the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community: once with Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, the previous Turkish Cypriot leader, in Cyprus in January 2010; and five times with Demetris Christofias and Derviş Eroğlu, in New York on 18 November 2010, in Geneva on 26 January and 7 July 2011, in New York at the Greentree Estate on 30 and 31 October 2011, and again at Greentree on 23 and 24 January 2012. My Special Adviser, Alexander Downer, and his team have been available throughout the process to support the negotiations between the two sides.

II. Background

4. Building on a four-month preparatory phase, negotiations on all chapters began in September 2008, with joint papers and bridging proposals prepared by both sides. The main areas being covered by the negotiations are: governance and power-sharing, European Union matters, the economy, property, territory, security and guarantees, and citizenship. In 2010, the sides submitted comprehensive proposals on governance and power-sharing, as well as on property. Making slow but steady progress throughout 2010, the sides reached convergence on a number of issues within the chapters of governance and power-sharing, the economy and European Union-related matters. Nonetheless, it became increasingly clear that resolution of the outstanding core issues would require a different approach.

5. In November 2010, the sides agreed to step up the pace of the negotiations and to focus their efforts on achieving substantive agreements on remaining core issues

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across all chapters. With new momentum and renewed focus, further convergences were reached on the chapters of the economy and European Union matters, as well as on internal aspects of security and international treaties that would be binding on a united Cyprus. In 2011, the sides continued to chip away at the key outstanding issues relating primarily to governance and power-sharing, property and citizenship.

6. In my last report, which followed my meeting with the two leaders in July 2011, I was pleased to report the demonstrated commitment of both sides to reach convergence on all core issues by our next meeting, scheduled for October 2011. I reported that the two leaders had agreed to intensify the negotiations, improve the methodology of the talks and redouble their efforts. It was agreed that this new impetus would entail initiating a comprehensive approach on all core issues and identifying substantive trade-offs within and across chapters.

7. In support of the process, I have used the period since my last report to keep the resolution of the Cyprus question high on the agenda of the United Nations, as well as on the agenda of key regional and international leaders. This has become particularly important as a number of other pressing issues in the region have taken on greater immediacy. I have continued to discuss the Cyprus question with various Heads of State and senior officials, including the President, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu; the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, David Cameron, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg; senior officials from the European Union; and Heads of State and Government of Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. My Special Adviser has also continued to engage with senior officials who are pivotal to the process, particularly those of the three guarantor Powers, namely Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

III. Status of the process

8. Since my last report in August 2011, the leaders have maintained a steady schedule of direct talks. As at the end of February 2012, they have met 33 times, while their representatives have met, separately, on 8 occasions. In addition, my Special Adviser and his team increased the pace of bilateral meetings with each side to assist in overcoming challenges, making use of the experts whom I made available to both sides. This process has been productive.

9. After our July meeting, the sides refocused negotiations on the core issues where progress was crucial in order for the talks to advance. This approach proved useful and, by the time I met with the leaders at Greentree on 30 and 31 October 2011, some positive movement was evident, particularly in the areas of the economy, European Union matters and internal aspects of security. At Greentree, the two sides showed willingness to compromise and, as a result, moved closer on core issues relating to governance and power-sharing, citizenship, property and territory. Moreover, both before and at Greentree, the sides engaged in a paring-down process that resulted in focusing on what both sides term as the "core core" issues: the election of the executive, the number of persons who would become citizens of a united Cyprus, and the basic design of a property regime.

10. The leaders assured me at Greentree in October 2011 that they believed that they could finalize a deal. With that assurance, I invited them back to Greentree in January 2012. Before that meeting, on 6 January 2012, I wrote to the two leaders

expressing the understanding that the talks had entered their final phase, and reviewing the steps for its implementation. I urged them to unblock the remaining obstacles in the negotiation so that substantive discussions at Greentree could open this pathway, leading to a multilateral conference and, ultimately, to a settlement. Both leaders responded by reiterating their commitment to a solution. It was my expectation that decisive moves on the three "core core" issues would be made at Greentree, adding to the considerable body of work already achieved by the two sides. However, while discussions at the meeting were robust and intensive, only limited progress was achieved.

11. Regarding the "core core" issues, the election of the executive remains at an impasse. With respect to citizenship, the sides have accepted an approach whereby an agreed number of persons from both sides would become citizens of a united Cyprus with the entry into force of a comprehensive agreement. On the issue of property, negotiations have arrived at the stage where the sides are exchanging data, which should assist them in reaching a common understanding based on their separate proposals. It is clear to both sides that full agreement on property will ultimately depend on the resolution of the question of territorial adjustment. The two sides have agreed that maps and figures will be discussed only in the period leading up to the multilateral conference.

12. Another crucial issue that remains unresolved is precisely how a settlement would be incorporated into European Union law. Both sides have put forward proposals that attempt to address some of the concerns of the other side. However, to date, neither side has found the other's proposals satisfactory.

13. Regarding the chapter of security and guarantees, internal aspects have largely been agreed. The external aspects of security can be resolved only in discussions with the guarantor Powers, as signatories to the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance.

14. Ahead of the January 2012 meeting at Greentree, Cyprus 2015, a civil society group and partner in United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Action for Cooperation and Trust in Cyprus (UNDP-ACT), shared a targeted policy brief with the two negotiating teams, which informed them about the state of public opinion on the issues under discussion and suggested ways forward in the peace process, including ensuring greater public ownership. The United Nations continues to encourage civil society engagement in the process.

15. Following recommendations submitted to the two leaders in July 2011 by the Gender Advisory Team, a civil society-based bicommunal group formed in 2009, the project team of bicommunal "ENGAGE: Do Your Part for Peace" initiative developed a process aimed at better integrating women's perspectives into reconciliation efforts. This process, called the "Active Dialogue Network", is aimed at supporting a platform for dialogue and exchange on the peace process and for incorporating a gender perspective into the peace process, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 1325 (2000). The platform could also provide an opportunity for citizens to participate more in the process and influence policymakers. The women of Cyprus have an important stake in a durable solution to the Cyprus problem, as well as specific needs that would need to be addressed in the context of a settlement. I commend such initiatives from civil society organizations, including women's groups, which seek to contribute to the peace process.

IV. Observations

16. Since my November 2010 meeting with the leaders, both sides have worked on the difficult task of breaking down the complex Cyprus problem into its core issues. Through this approach, the sides continued to identify and address the most crucial elements of a solution to the Cyprus problem, and have made some additional progress in resolving them.

17. I came away from our first meeting in Greentree assured by the leaders that a comprehensive settlement could be achieved. However, no further convergences in the talks were reached before our second meeting at Greentree. I was disappointed with this lack of progress, and conveyed my disappointment to the leaders at Greentree in January.

18. In this Cypriot-owned and Cypriot-led process, it is up to the leaders to take the negotiations to a successful conclusion. Accordingly, I have reassured them that the United Nations does not seek to impose solutions. At the same time, I have repeatedly expressed my point of view that the negotiations should not be open-ended; the longer the talks have been drawn out, the more disillusioned the public has become and the harder it has become to conclude agreements.

19. At this advanced stage of the negotiations, it is important to recall that, since the start of the process, a significant number of convergences have been reached across various key chapters of the negotiations. As a Cypriot-led process, these achievements are entirely Cypriot-owned. At the moment, however, the negotiations on the "core core" issues that remain to be agreed, are close to deadlock. Despite the leaders' repeated commitments to intensify the negotiations and push for a conclusion as soon as possible, the fact that there has been such limited movement towards convergence on core issues in recent months is a matter of concern.

V. Conclusions

20. The leaders must now make decisive moves that will demonstrate that agreement is indeed within their grasp. They must focus their efforts on resolving the outstanding challenges. In particular, they must find a way to move beyond the existing deadlock on the election of the executive and advance more definitively on property and citizenship. Regarding property, while I understand that some aspects cannot be completely finalized until decisions are made on maps and figures relating to territory, it should now be possible for both sides to agree on a common understanding on property that is simple, clear, and contingent upon those decisions. I note with satisfaction that the sides have embarked on the exchange of data on property referred to in my statement following the second meeting at Greentree.

21. There is no doubt that the political environment in which the negotiations are currently taking place has become increasingly difficult. Nonetheless, it is incumbent upon the leaders to foster a more conducive atmosphere for the talks by refraining from engaging in negative rhetoric about each other and the process and by preserving the confidentiality of the talks. In addition to preserving the integrity of the process, decisive action in this regard would also contribute to building public confidence in its viability which, at present, is low.

22. Civil society also has a crucial role to play in building public confidence in the process. Unfortunately, civil society organizations, and women's groups in particular, remain outside the framework of the negotiations. I therefore call on the sides to step up their engagement with civil society and women's groups, with a view to building public confidence in the benefits of a settlement and ensuring that, once it is reached, the settlement is sustainable and truly representative of the needs and aspirations of all Cypriots.

23. The time for an agreement is now. The domestic, regional and international context is constantly shifting. The current window of opportunity is not limitless and there is little to suggest that the future will bring more propitious circumstances for a settlement. The United Nations remains convinced that if the necessary political will could be mustered on both sides, a durable settlement could be achieved in the interests of all Cypriots. I have full confidence in the efforts of my Special Adviser, Alexander Downer, and his team to support such an outcome.

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Letter dated 9 March 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the attached letter dated 6 March 2012, from the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, forwarding a report on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, covering the period from 1 November 2011 to 31 January 2012 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could bring the present letter and its attachment to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

Letter dated 6 March 2012 from the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolutions 1386 (2001) and 1943 (2010), I attach a report on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force covering the period from 1 November 2011 to 31 January 2012 (see enclosure). I would appreciate it if you would make this report available to the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Anders Fogh **Rasmussen**

Enclosure

Quarterly report to the Security Council on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force

Introduction

1. This report, pursuant to the request in Security Council resolutions 1386 (2001) and 1943 (2010), informs the United Nations on the progress of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), covering the period from 1 November 2011 to 31 January 2012. As at 9 January 2012, total ISAF strength stood at 130,236 personnel provided by all 28 NATO countries and 22 non-NATO countries. Bahrain became the fiftieth ISAF troop-contributing country and operational partner to ISAF in December 2011. NATO and ISAF reiterate their invitation to additional United Nations Members to support this United Nations-mandated mission by providing advisers and trainers for the Afghan National Security Forces as well as increasing their support for the civilian sectors of governance and development.

2. Throughout the reporting period, ISAF continued to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions. From 1 November 2011 to 31 January 2012, ISAF suffered 1,432 casualties, including 76 killed in action, 876 wounded in action and 11 non-battle-related deaths.

3. During this reporting period, enemy-initiated attacks continued to trend downwards and the nationwide change was 9 per cent lower in 2011 when compared to 2010. However, in the eastern part of the country, the enemy-initiated attacks increased, owing primarily to deliberate operations of ISAF and the Afghan security forces to push the insurgency further beyond the population centres. The operational effectiveness of the Afghan security forces improved from the previous quarter and is advancing at a pace acceptable to sustain transition. The number of partnered and Afghan-led operations continued to increase, with the Afghan security forces becoming more capable of conducting security operations across the country. According to the recent Asia Foundation survey, the Afghan public is becoming increasingly confident in the ability of its forces to provide for its security. The security incidents this quarter were marked by the suicide attacks in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif on 6 December 2011, which caused a large number of civilian casualties by targeting Shia Muslims commemorating the holiday of Ashura.

4. Additional noteworthy events for this reporting period:

(a) From 16 to 19 November, the consultative Loya Jirga was conducted in Kabul. The Afghan National Security Forces successfully managed the security arrangements with minimal support from ISAF. In the opening speech, President Karzai underlined the necessity of continued international military and economic support beyond 2014, while also asserting Afghan sovereignty.

(b) On 26 November, while conducting clearance of a suspected insurgent training camp close to the Pakistan border, ISAF and Afghan security forces units came under fire from the overlooking ridgeline in Pakistan. Owing to a series of miscommunications, Pakistani military positions were mistakenly engaged by ISAF close air support. The incident resulted in the destruction of two border posts, and 26 Pakistani soldiers were killed in action. As a result of the close border incident, a

series of prevention and mitigation measures have been put in place to prevent a similar incident from occurring. Pakistan authorities have since closed the border crossing points for ISAF logistical transports.

(c) On 27 November, the second tranche of areas to enter transition was announced by President Karzai. The second tranche comprises a further 18 areas. Implementation of the second tranche began in Parwan Province on 1 December 2011 and is now under way in all tranche 2 areas, except for Sari Pul Province (Regional Command North), which has been postponed.

(d) On 5 January, President Karzai ordered the Constitutional Oversight Commission to complete the transfer of the United States-run detention facility in Parwan to Afghan authorities within a month. The President's decision came after the Commission reported violations of the Afghan Constitution, which provides that no foreign countries can maintain and run prisons in Afghanistan, as well as of the Afghan Criminal Code. In February 2012, President Karzai extended the timeline to 9 March 2012.

(e) On 20 January, soldiers from a French operational mentoring and liaison team in Regional Command East, Kapisa Province, were engaged by an Afghan National Army soldier, resulting in 4 ISAF soldiers killed in action and 14 wounded in action (all casualties French). ISAF troop-contributing countries have expressed strong concerns about the loss of life and consequences of the incidents that have involved Afghan security forces personnel attacking ISAF troops, and have asked the Afghan authorities to improve their screening and vetting of recruits.

Security situation

5. Enemy-initiated attacks[a] have declined when compared to the same quarter of 2010/11. Insurgent efforts to maintain operations into the winter with high-profile attacks and assassinations have been largely ineffective. The insurgency failed to achieve this objective, owing to a combination of persistent Afghan and ISAF conventional and special forces operations, ongoing clear, hold and build operations, reintegration efforts, and the expansion of local defence initiatives.



[a] Enemy-initiated attacks comprise enemy action (enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and explosive hazard events, including executed attacks only (improvised explosive device explosions/mine strikes).

6. Insurgents continue to rely on improvised explosive devices as the principal means to execute their campaign. During the reporting period, the insurgency was accountable for 84 per cent of civilian casualties, of which 60 per cent were caused by the indiscriminate use of improvised explosive devices. More than half of the improvised explosive devices and mines were found and cleared rather than detonated.

7. Regionally, the security situation is as follows:

(a) **Regional Command Southwest.** In Regional Command Southwest, enemy-initiated attacks in 2011 were 29 per cent lower than in 2010. Deliberate combined team operations maintained pressure on insurgents during the beginning of the winter season, which helped to reduce insurgent capacity. Improved governance from the Provincial Governor, Gulab Mangal, and combined team efforts have strengthened and expanded the security bubble centred on Lashkar Gah. Operations continue in northern and southern Helmand to disrupt insurgent strongholds. The small ISAF force reductions during the final quarter of 2011 have not affected operations, but future significant reductions may well test the capabilities of the Afghan security forces, who to date have performed well.



(b) **Regional Command South.** The improving capability of the Afghan security forces and the success of combined team operations maintained pressure on insurgents and limited their ability to operate. A small increase in the number of security incidents during the reporting period and recent resurgence in suicide attacks in the Kandahar area reiterates the importance of the south to the insurgency. Insurgents increasingly targeted Afghan security forces and Government officials in an effort to regain influence over the population.



(c) **Regional Command East.** Security incidents in Regional Command East have followed a general winter decline, but persisted at higher levels than previously seen and are spread across the Regional Command because of a geographically diverse enemy. Supplies and fighters originating in Pakistan and moving across the border have enabled the insurgents in the region to maintain their operational capability and tempo. Increased pressure from ISAF and the Afghan security forces, coupled with Afghan local security initiatives, are working to disrupt these supply routes and therefore hamper insurgent operations. Strained relations during the reporting period between ISAF/Government of Afghanistan and Pakistan underline the importance of cooperation for security and stability in the border region.



(d) **Regional Command North.** Insurgent networks in the north still represent a threat to combined team forces and the Government of Afghanistan, but to a smaller degree than in the other Regional Commands. Actual numbers of security incidents decreased during the last quarter, demonstrating the insurgents' inability to transform their rhetoric into actions. Though a positive attitude towards security forces has been reported among the populace, corruption within those representing the Government remains of great concern.



(e) **Regional Command West.** The success of combined team operations and improved popular support towards both the Government of Afghanistan and ISAF have resulted in an overall decrease in the number of security incidents. These contributing factors have resulted in the degradation of both the morale and capabilities of the insurgents in Regional Command West. Enemy-initiated attacks have remained largely uncoordinated, ineffective and will likely decrease throughout the winter until the 2012 fighting season begins.



(f) **Regional Command Capital.** The improved capabilities of the Afghan security forces, significant cache finds, the expansion of the Kabul security zone and coalition forces operations in Regional Command East have limited the effectiveness of insurgent activities in the capital, culminating in a virtual lack of insurgent kinetic activity in January 2012. Although security incidents are most likely to remain stable in the next quarter, insurgents will intermittently attempt to challenge the perception of security in Kabul Province as a kinetic incident in the capital is likely to garner significant media attention.



Afghan National Security Forces

8. The development of the Afghan National Security Forces is on track in terms of both size and quality. The forces are on a glide path to meet the strength goals of October 2012, while command and control capacities continue to be built up and improved. One of the main efforts of ISAF is towards further professionalization of the forces. Substantial progress in reliability and sustainability of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police has been achieved.

9. In 2011, the Afghan security forces added 57,000 soldiers and police to their numbers. Currently, almost 40 per cent of conventional and special forces operations are led by Afghan forces, and approximately 90 per cent of the operations are partnered with ISAF.

10. Strong recruitment has allowed the Afghan forces to remain on track towards the next strength target of 352,000 by October 2012. In addition to growing combat forces, the Afghan security ministries made substantial progress in increasing the quality of their forces. With the support and advice of the Coalition, the Afghan security force units are becoming more capable and have improved their ability to conduct autonomous operations in the field. Efforts are being made to establish proficient headquarters at national and regional levels and to improve planning and coordination capacity. In addition, the Afghan forces are progressively assuming more responsibility for self-training.

11. The establishment of training institutions is close to completion and fosters the progressive professionalization of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. The development of the security forces continues to focus on five key areas: training Afghan trainers and instructors; accelerating leader development; building literacy and vocational skills; inculcating an ethos of stewardship; and developing enduring institutions, systems and enablers. Additional trainers and advisers from the international community are still required to accelerate professionalization further and help to create effective and sustainable Afghan security forces. Furthermore, ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan are now reinforcing the vetting process for the security forces to improve safety for ISAF embedded personnel and prevent a deterioration of confidence between international trainers and advisers and their Afghan counterparts.

Afghan National Army

12. The Afghan National Army currently constitutes the most robust and self-sufficient organization in the Afghan security forces. The Afghan Army has entered the last fielding phase, the goal of which is to reinforce the sustainability of a more balanced professional force able to assume the security lead. To this end, combat support and combat service support units, along with corps and brigade troops[b] are being created and trained. Fielding of these new enabling units should be completed by the end of 2013. Furthermore, a more autonomous logistics branch continues to be developed. Finally, significant efforts are being made to finalize the establishment of a complete training institution allowing the Afghans to professionalize the force by themselves. An Afghan Army training command was set up to this end and 12 army branch schools permanently work at full capacity with more than 20,000 trainees. The overall training level for the army is increasing slowly but steadily.

13. The Afghan National Army remains on track to achieve its growth target of 195,000 by October 2012. Its current strength is around 184,000 soldiers. Army recruiting remains strong and ethnically balanced, and gender equity is permanently promoted by ISAF through the NATO Training Mission — Afghanistan.[c] The percentage of all Afghan Army kandaks (battalions) rated "effective with advisers" or higher increased to 44 per cent during this reporting period. As mentioned in the previous reports, the attrition rates are decreasing slowly but remain high and continue to generate additional recruitment and training costs. A comprehensive plan, including midterm and long-term solutions, has been developed in partnership with Afghan leaders to address this persistent issue.

14. Regarding the fielded Afghan Army, the issues to be solved remain leadership skills, high attrition, staff planning, tactical coordination and logistics.

Afghan Air Force

15. The development of the Afghan Air Force is under way and, in addition to the personnel recruitment and professionalization highlighted in the previous reports, infrastructure building has made significant process. New facilities have been delivered in support of a self-sustaining force. Important investments are foreseen to improve Air Force training sites and infrastructure, which are critical conditions for sound development and self-sustainability. The Afghan Air Force still faces some major challenges, with an important corruption level and recruiting issues, in particular in the ability to obtain qualified recruits.

16. Afghan Air Force strength reached 5,172 personnel in December 2011 and the attrition rates are lower than in the Army and national police. A total of 82 aircraft are in service within the Air Force, including 42 helicopters, and there are plans to reach up to 145 aircraft in total when the Air Force is fully fielded in 2016. International support remains critical for Air Force development, training and support to autonomously led Afghan security force operations.

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[b] Military police companies, military intelligence units, engineer battalions, signal battalions, route clearance companies, and mobile strike force battalions.

[c] There are currently 333 women serving in the Afghan National Army, nearly all of them in Kabul.

Afghan National Police

17. Overall, the Afghan National Police is currently on track for the October 2012 target. Its current strength is around 144,000 police officers. Authorized manning for both Afghan uniformed police and Afghan Border Police patrolmen is full; recruiting has been adjusted to focus on recruiting direct entry non-commissioned officers and to balance growth with training of non-commissioned officers and new patrolmen. The focus on training continues as the training seat capacity surpassed 15,000 and the training fill rate stood at around 65 per cent.

18. The personnel establishment for 2011 provides over 1,500 additional female billets. There are currently 1,244 women serving in the Afghan National Police. The recruitment of women is lagging behind for a variety of reasons, mainly commanders' reluctance to accept female officers.

19. The operational effectiveness of the Afghan National Police showed remarkable progress within the force. The report of December 2011 is the first one in which any police units were rated "independent with advisers". For the uniformed police, 40 per cent of units were rated "effective with advisers" or higher, while for the Afghan Border Police and the Afghan Civil Order Police, the rates were 53 per cent and 57 per cent, respectively.

Institutional capacity

20. The security ministries, with the assistance of the NATO Training Mission, are sustaining their continuous effort to build capability to generate and sustain the Afghan security forces. The Ministry of Defence and the General Staff still require assistance to accomplish their mission. During the reporting period, the Ministry of Defence confirmed an improved capability at the managerial level as demonstrated by the effective management of the initiation of transition tranche 2.

21. The Ministry of the Interior still requires significant assistance and is expected to progress to requiring only some assistance by the end of 2012. Key issues remaining include shortcomings in filling civilian positions because of the lack of civil service pay and grade reform.

Private security companies/Afghan Public Protection Force

22. Nine months after the signature of the bridging strategy (March 2011), the Afghan Public Protection Force remains largely non-existent. The strategy calls for the dissolution of private security companies conducting development and convoy protection by 20 March 2012 and those conducting protection of ISAF bases and construction by 20 March 2013. The Joint Programme Executive Office has been established to support the transition from private security companies and to mentor the Public Protection Force, building adequate capability to support the bridging strategy. The Office could thus encourage development implementing partners to take the decision to continue development and infrastructure works. In order to accelerate the development of a business capability, command and control structure, and guard training capacity, several private security companies are mutating into risk management companies as a stopgap solution. The risk management companies will assist with management, oversight, training and operational standards until the Public Protection Force is fully capable of managing security operations. Assistance from the ministerial partners of the Public Protection Force (timely issuing of visas

by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, work permits from the Ministry of Labour, communication licences from the Ministry of Communication, armoured vehicle licences from the Ministry of the Interior to ensure no gap in security) is still critical to achieve President Karzai's deadline.

Civilian casualties

23. The protection of the Afghan population remains the highest priority for ISAF and every civilian casualty is detrimental to the ISAF mission. Among several initiatives, ISAF has dedicated special attention to the understanding and prevention of events that could result in civilian casualties. New tactical directives were issued this quarter and the entire ISAF force was retrained on them. The ISAF Deputy Commander became Chair of a new ISAF Civilian Casualties Avoidance and Mitigation Board to provide constant senior staff oversight of this issue. The Commander of ISAF held a conference at ISAF headquarters on 17 and 18 January 2012, in order to gather lessons learned from NATO operations in Libya, synchronize commanders' understanding of the ISAF Commander's Tactical Directive (Rev.4), and evolve future air support to partnered and non-partnered Afghan National Security Force units from a combat aviator's perspective.

24. Reporting this quarter indicates that the insurgents are responsible for 84 per cent of overall incidents relating to civilian casualties, which represents an increase of 7 per cent. The total number of civilian casualties is down by 19 per cent when compared to the previous reporting period. ISAF actions were attributed to only 6 per cent of all civilian casualty-related incidents, which is representative of the continued decreasing trend when compared to previous reports. December 2011 represents the lowest number of ISAF-caused civilian casualties since accurate record-keeping began in January 2009. It remains very apparent that the insurgency can still exploit and manipulate civilian casualty events to their advantage, since ISAF is perceived by the Afghan population to be accountable for all incidents where casualties occur. The figures reported in the chart reflect incidents of conflict-related civilian casualties (deaths and wounded) that have been confirmed through investigation to have been caused by either ISAF or insurgents. The data reported here is consistent with ISAF policy, which directs that all credible allegations of civilian casualties be reviewed.


Civilian Casualties caused by ISAF
Civilian Casualties caused by Insurgents
Year-over-Year Change in ISAF-caused civilian deaths in 2011 vs. 2010: -17%
Number of Casualties

Counter-narcotics

25. Afghan security forces, with the support of their ISAF partners, seized a record amount of narcotics and precursor chemicals in 2011, especially morphine, well in excess of the total seized in 2010. While disruption to the trade is significant, operations are not having a long-term impact on narcotics networks, as they are able to adapt and move, returning to pre-operational levels of activities once operations are complete.

26. Initial indications show opium cultivation decreasing in areas of better security. Near-record high opium prices drove farmers to plant poppy in large numbers, including in new areas where cultivation had previously been financially prohibitive. Cultivation has also migrated to more remote areas with limited security and small Coalition footprints as a result of successful operations in 2011.

27. Programmes to prepare Afghan security forces and improve capabilities at all levels are vital to ensure that Afghanistan is able to sustain counter-narcotics operations post-transition. ISAF will continue to provide support to Government counter-narcotics programmes and operations in order to disrupt, neutralize and influence the narcotics industry and its funding of the insurgency in Afghanistan. ISAF will continue to synchronize operations to the poppy cultivation cycle, in order to maximize disruptive effects and further support this aim.

Governance

28. ISAF continues to provide support to Afghan-led governance efforts, particularly in key areas of transition, reintegration, counter-corruption and rule of law improvement.

Transition

29. The implementation of tranche 2 is now under way. The Government continued to work jointly with NATO on the implementation of tranche 1 and 2 areas of transition as well as the planning for tranche 3. With tranche 2 now started, roughly 50 per cent of the Afghan population is in an area where security has been shifted to Afghan lead. ISAF continues to support the Afghan security forces in transition areas through various levels of oversight, training and provision of key enabler capabilities. The Joint Afghan-NATO *Inteqal* Board (JANIB) has endorsed the security, governance and development, strategic communication, and Provincial Reconstruction Team evolution components of all the transition implementation plans for tranche 2 areas. Transition ceremonies, organized and led by the Transition Coordination Commission, are now under way in all tranche 2 areas, except for Sari Pul Province in Regional Command North, which has been postponed. Transition implementation will be held off until Afghan processes have time to resolve the issues. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

Anti-corruption

30. A NATO building integrity training team visited Kabul from 2 to 15 December. The team delivered a defence leadership in building integrity course to 45 students at the Afghan Police College followed by a building integrity train the trainers course for 12 students at the National Military Academy. The team then mentored Afghan trainers as they delivered a defence leadership in building integrity course to

35 students at the National Military Academy. This is the first time that Afghan trainers have delivered building integrity training and is a significant milestone in the implementation of the programme. With Task Force Shafafiyat (transparency), ISAF has been supporting Government efforts to reduce corruption in the government.

31. The NATO Public Affairs Conference on Afghanistan was held in Dubai on 10 December 2011. Around 100 spokespersons and press officers from NATO, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the European Union and ISAF headquarters and key Afghan Government spokespersons and media representatives attended the Conference. In addition, the Afghan Government Media and Information Centre undertook to host a workshop in Kabul for communicators in the capital to further explore ways of increasing the Afghan voice in all communications.

Support to rule of law development

32. Through the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission, ISAF is providing liaison and field capabilities to assist the Government and international civilian experts in improving capacity. The Support Mission focuses its efforts on helping the Government to expand rule of law outreach into key provinces and districts.

Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme

33. Afghan-led reconciliation and reintegration efforts met with mixed success over the past few months. Reintegration continued to show steady incremental progress as small groups of Taliban entered the process over the quarter, particularly in Regional Commands North and West. ISAF is actively supporting its Afghan partners' efforts to accelerate reintegration, in an effort to make it an increasingly attractive alternative for insurgents. As at the end of January, the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme had formally reintegrated a total of 3,028 insurgents. This represents an increase of around 300 reintegrated persons over the previous quarter.

Development

34. As the link between security, governance and development, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan will gradually change focus from direct delivery of services to technical assistance and capacity-building, including improvement of Afghan national and subnational governance institution linkages. Provincial Reconstruction Teams will hand over their functions to either the Afghan local administrations, the private sector or other stakeholders, such as non-governmental organizations, national consulates and aid agencies. The evolution of the Teams will lead to an ultimate dissolution scheduled by the end of 2014. The office of the NATO senior civilian representative, the lead for Provincial Reconstruction Team evolution, and ISAF headquarters have produced and disseminated assistance documents and guidance, a Provincial Reconstruction Team Evolution Planning Toolkit and "Guidance to JANIB transition plans" to help troop-contributing countries to identify Provincial Reconstruction Team evolution dependencies and how to hand off activities. As part of transition implementation plans, evolution plans for tranches 1 and 2 were approved by JANIB and their preparation for the remaining provinces is ongoing.

Children affected by armed conflict

35. The North Atlantic Council met on 22 February 2012 with its ISAF partners to discuss the issue of children affected by armed conflict and the ongoing cooperation between NATO and the United Nations on this issue. The Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, shared her views via videoconference. The North Atlantic Council agreed on a series of additional concrete and practical steps to be taken, including the development of guidelines for strategic commanders and a review of the NATO policy on contractor support to operations to ensure that NATO does not do business with contractors using child labour. Specific reporting on children affected by armed conflict will be included in future NATO quarterly reports to the United Nations on ISAF operations. NATO also appointed a high-level focal point on children affected by armed conflict to further interact with the United Nations on this topic.

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Security Council

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Letter dated 12 March 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to Security Council resolution 2004 (2011), in which the Council requested me to conduct, before the end of 2011, a strategic review of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in an effort to ensure, together with peacekeeping good practice, that the mission is configured most appropriately to fulfil its mandated tasks.

In accordance with resolution 2004 (2011), and following consultations with Security Council members, countries contributing troops to UNIFIL and to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the parties, a multidisciplinary team from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations visited UNIFIL to conduct the strategic review from 8 to 18 December 2011. Mr. Julian Harston, a retired Assistant Secretary-General in the United Nations, led the review team as an independent expert. The review team also held meetings with troop-contributing countries and Ambassadors of the permanent members of the Security Council in Beirut, as well as separate meetings with the Lebanese Armed Forces and with the Israel Defense Forces. Mr. Harston conveyed on 24 January 2012 the preliminary findings of the review to members of the Security Council at the expert level, and UNIFIL and UNTSO troop-contributing countries. The Governments of Israel and Lebanon were kept informed of the review process. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations approved the report on the UNIFIL strategic review on 2 March 2012.

It is useful to recall the context in which the strategic review was undertaken. More than five years after the adoption of resolution 1701 (2006), the parties remain committed to its full implementation and continue to adhere to the cessation of hostilities and to respect the Blue Line. This is due in no small measure to the presence and activities of UNIFIL — an effective, mobile and credible force, capable of meeting its main objectives of deterrence, prevention and deconfliction. The UNIFIL liaison and coordination arrangements, including the tripartite mechanism, have played an essential role in keeping the situation calm. The process of visibly marking the Blue Line has contributed to a decrease in inadvertent violations, and has acted as an important confidence-building measure.

The situation on the ground and at sea in the UNIFIL area of operations has stabilized. But there has been no tangible progress towards a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution as called for in resolution 1701 (2006). UNIFIL does not have the mandate or the tools to tackle the root causes of the conflict, which remain largely unaddressed.

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It is the expectation of the United Nations that the parties will fulfil their obligations with respect to the cessation of hostilities in accordance with the letters from the Secretary-General to the parties, which were brought to the attention of the Security Council on 21 August 2006 (see S/2006/675). As I have noted in my successive reports on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), and in my letter dated 12 February 2010 to the President of the Security Council (S/2010/86), it is the responsibility of the parties to take advantage of the opportunity provided by the presence of UNIFIL, which has provided a strong deterrent to the resumption of hostilities and has laid the foundation for building a process that can achieve a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution, as envisaged in resolution 1701 (2006).

The strategic review is timely, not only as a means to reflect on the achievements of UNIFIL and the challenges that it has faced but as an opportunity to capitalize on UNIFIL strengths to further the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and, in so doing, safeguard those achievements. The strategic review looks forward. It is not a review of the UNIFIL mandate, authorized strength or rules of engagement. I note that both parties were united in the opinion that UNIFIL should stay, and that, as far as possible, it should retain its present strength, composition and deployment in its area of operations.

The strategic review identified three strategic priorities for UNIFIL in the implementation of its mandate:

- Establish an integrated, comprehensive approach to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), prioritize United Nations goals, and ensure better integration between UNIFIL, the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the United Nations country team.
- Further involve the Government of Lebanon in the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), in particular through seeking to increase its involvement, and that of its ministries and security institutions, in southern Lebanon.
- Increase the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces, not only as a prerequisite for the gradual assumption of effective and sustainable security control of the UNIFIL area of operations and Lebanese territorial waters, but also as a key element to support moves towards a permanent ceasefire.

In the light of these priorities, the strategic review made a number of key recommendations, which are summarized below.

Strategic dialogue mechanism

In its resolution 2004 (2011), the Security Council called for an acceleration of the pace of the strategic dialogue. Accordingly, a central focus of the strategic review was on the strategic dialogue process as a means to strengthen not only the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces to assume greater security responsibilities in southern Lebanon and Lebanese territorial waters but also as a means to enable the Lebanese Armed Forces to move towards a permanent ceasefire. The review noted that this entails greater UNIFIL coordination with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and United Nations agencies in Lebanon, as well as the increased involvement of the Government of Lebanon at large.

In seeking to ensure that the strategic dialogue becomes an integrated, mainstream function within UNIFIL, and to help to reorient its objectives, benchmarks and timelines for land and maritime forces, the strategic review recommended political leadership of the process by either the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander or a person designated by him.

The review also recommended the establishment of a coordination mechanism between UNIFIL, the Lebanese Armed Forces, the Government of Lebanon and international donors to ensure a comprehensive approach and support to the strategic dialogue mechanism. The review recommended exploring with donors, including troop-contributing countries and other Member States, and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon the possibility of creating this coordination mechanism to equip, train (for operational and non-operational activities), and provide assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces in fulfilling tasks mandated under resolution 1701 (2006).

The review also identified the need for UNIFIL to undertake a separate internal study to address the issue of increased UNIFIL involvement in capacity-building for the Lebanese Armed Forces, and in order to examine the feasibility of and the criteria for formalizing bilateral assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces for the sole purpose of implementing tasks mandated under resolution 1701 (2006).

Liaison and coordination

In the light of the tragic and deadly exchange of fire between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces in August 2010, the review highlighted the need for UNIFIL to engage with both parties to further develop liaison and coordination arrangements for times of crisis, when there are breaches of the cessation of hostilities. Strategic decision-making and guidance, including in the liaison role, and security arrangements with the parties should be strengthened to ensure that there is no escalation in case of an incident.

Building on the efforts of UNIFIL, the review recommended that UNIFIL should focus more on promoting arrangements and pragmatic localized understandings between the parties, which would serve to further stabilize the situation along the Blue Line, remove pretexts and possible points of friction, and prevent future incidents.

As regards the continuing process of visibly marking the Blue Line, the review noted the parties' different understandings of the Blue Line. In the next stage, UNIFIL should tackle areas that are potentially problematic, either by reaching an agreement to go ahead with marking or by reaching an understanding on rules of engagement and/or security arrangements in those areas.

The review assessed that the establishment of an office in Tel Aviv, agreed by the Government of Israel in February 2007, remains of critical importance for UNIFIL, to enhance the current level of liaison and allow for a strategic dialogue with the Israel Defense Forces and other Israeli authorities on UNIFIL-related issues.

Tripartite mechanism

The tripartite mechanism is the primary tool for strategic liaison and coordination between UNIFIL and the parties. It is a credit to the parties that they

have utilized the tripartite mechanism to de-escalate tensions and resolve conflicts in a peaceful manner.

The review recommended that UNIFIL build on its current efforts and activities, and examine the possibility of further strengthening the tripartite mechanism to facilitate practical arrangements on the ground between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces that would build confidence and defuse tension in potential flashpoints, as appropriate and deemed acceptable by the parties. UNIFIL should explore the idea of establishing additional trilateral subcommittees, like the Blue Line subcommittee, as deemed appropriate and acceptable by the parties. The mission should continue to ensure that the tripartite mechanism is as flexible as possible and able to discuss a wider range of issues at the request of the parties.

Operational activities

The review highlighted the importance of the impact of UNIFIL operational activities in advancing the objectives of resolution 1701 (2006), rather than their number. It called attention to incidents of restriction of the Force's freedom of movement, some of which involved aggressive behaviour, including the taking of United Nations equipment, and cautioned that UNIFIL must be careful not to accept voluntary restrictions on its freedom of movement. The review noted the importance of improving relations with the local population, and in this regard recommended the development of a sustainable, long-term strategy and the reinforcement of the UNIFIL civil affairs capacity, particularly its national staff component. The review also recommended that UNIFIL strengthen its coordination of public outreach activities.

Prior to the commencement of the strategic review, the Office of Military Affairs of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations conducted a military capability study of UNIFIL from 27 November to 7 December 2011. The findings of the military capability study informed the strategic review on the capability, deployment and configuration of UNIFIL land forces, including the UNTSO Observer Group Lebanon, and its maritime forces. The military capability study assessed that the priority effort of UNIFIL could be oriented more efficiently to tasks that contribute directly to mandate implementation by maintaining and enhancing activities conducted in cooperation and coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, and by focusing UNIFIL independent operational activities along the Blue Line. The military capability study also analysed and assessed, in consultation with UNIFIL, the possibility of troop adjustment within the authorized strength of 15,000 troops, and in response to the prevailing situation on the ground. To this end, from a strictly military point of view, a number of observations were made, with an eye to contributing to a leaner but no less capable Force.

Accordingly, the review recommended that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations work closely with the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander to validate the observations and recommendations of the military capability study and ensure that the Force's capability to implement its mandated tasks is in no way curtailed and is consistent with the strategic priorities described above. The review also recommended that UNIFIL should take greater advantage of the added value of military observers from the UNTSO Observer Group Lebanon, and should utilize them for specific functions under the UNIFIL mandate.

Mission integration and coordination

The review recognized that UNIFIL cannot be isolated from the political nature of resolution 1701 (2006), and that security conditions and the political process are mutually dependent. In addition to recommending that UNIFIL ensure greater synergy between its military and civilian components, and recognizing a particular need to optimize the capacity of the mission's political component, the review recommended the appointment of a civilian Deputy Head of Mission, in parallel to and at the same level as the Deputy Force Commander, in order to strengthen and institutionalize the relationship between the political and the military leadership of UNIFIL. It is noted that given the current staffing configuration of UNIFIL, the recommendation is resource neutral.

The review also recommended the establishment of a formalized consultative process between UNIFIL and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon. This should be conducted with due regard to maintaining autonomy for the missions concerned in areas under their exclusive purview.

Although a wide-ranging evaluation of the United Nations presence in Lebanon was not in the terms of reference of the strategic review, the review identified a need for a formal assessment of the overall United Nations presence in Lebanon, with a view to optimizing the considerable human and material resources in the country and enabling more effective United Nations advocacy and engagement with political and military interlocutors in Lebanon and Israel, particularly in the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 29 February 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Ms. Barbara Hendrie, Mr. Paul McKell, Mr. Paul Williams, Mr. Michael Redmond, Mr. Jesse Clarke, Mr. Yasser Baki, Ms. Alexandra Davison, Mr. Guy Denison-Smith, Mr. Malcolm Green, Ms. Carey Scott, Mr. Iain Griffiths, Mrs. Emma Weekley, Mr. Owen Williams, Mr. Mungo Woodifield, Ms. Caroline Payne, Mr. Simon Cleobury, Ms. Rhian Checkland, Ms. Alexandra Gregory and Mr. Dominic Rhodes have been appointed alternate representatives of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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